Corporate liability of crypto asset trading operators after the transfer of supervision to the Indonesian Financial Services Authority

Abstract

Since 10 January 2025, crypto asset trading in Indonesia has been supervised by the Financial Services Authority (OJK) rather than the Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency (Bappebti). This normative study, using statutory, conceptual, and event-based case approaches, examines what the transfer actually changed, how corporate liability for consumer losses is constructed, and how OJK supervision and enforcement protect consumers. No civil court or alternative dispute resolution decision is analysed; the 2024 Indodax hack, the Botxcoin collapse, and the 2022 Zipmex freeze serve as test scenarios. A provision-by-provision comparison shows that the layered architecture, fund segregation at the clearing house, and custodian liability for loss already existed under Bappebti; the genuinely new elements are statutory status under Law No. 4 of 2026, controller liability, and integrated prudential and market conduct supervision. Consumer assets are intangible property held in a deposit-like relationship, but omnibus wallets registered to traders weaken that claim in insolvency, a gap that capital market rules on custodial accounts can fill by analogy through implementing regulation. The statutory fault-based rule in Article 221A and the custodian loss rule in OJK Regulation No. 27 of 2024 can be read as general and special regimes, but true strict liability requires statutory footing. Administrative fines for consumer protection breaches reach IDR 15 billion, Article 221D carries no criminal sanction of its own, and OJK’s institutional lawsuit under Regulation No. 38 of 2025 is not a class action. It recommends per-consumer segregation, an explicit non-estate rule, mandatory loss reserves, and statutory custodian liability.